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Abstract
People like to feel good about past decisions. This paper models
self-justi¯cation of past decisions. The model is axiomatic: axioms
are de¯ned on preference over ex ante actions (modeled formally by
menus). The representation of preference admits the interpretation
that the agent adjusts beliefs after taking an action so as to be more
optimistic about its possible consequences. In particular, the ex post
choice of beliefs is part of the representation of preference and not a
primitive assumption. Behavioral characterizations are given to the
comparisons \1 exhibits more dissonance than 2" and \1 is more self-
justifying than 2."
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Objective
There is considerable evidence in psychology that people like to view them-
selves as being smart, and in particular, as having made correct decisions
in the past. Thus they may change beliefs after taking an action and be-
come more optimistic about its possible consequences, in order to feel better
about having chosen it. Such behavior is a special case of an a±nity for
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1cognitive consistency - for example, an a±nity for consistency among beliefs
or opinions (Festinger [13]). Here the two cognitions are \I have taken an
action that could lead to unfavorable outcomes" and \I am a smart person
who would not make poor choices"; adopting a more optimistic belief about
future outcomes serves to reduce this dissonance. Though the term cognitive
dissonance is often used more broadly, we use it here to refer to ex post self-
justi¯cation of past actions. Our objective is to model an agent who exhibits
such cognitive dissonance.
Models of cognitive dissonance in economics treat beliefs as choice vari-
ables, on a par with other more standard choice variables, such as consump-
tion and savings. Thus Akerlof and Dickens [1, p. 307] propose as basic
propositions of their model of cognitive dissonance that preference is de¯ned
over beliefs and that beliefs are subject to choice. While a more optimistic
outlook makes one feel better about the past decision, the agent recognizes
that adopting more optimistic beliefs would take her further from the \truth"
and thus would lead to suboptimal choices in decisions still to be made. The
optimal belief is determined by making this trade-o®. Similarly, in Rabin
[28], utility depends directly on beliefs. This modeling approach is nonstan-
dard in economics and may make one uncomfortable for a number of reasons.
First, it begs the question \what is the feasible set from which beliefs are cho-
sen?" Unlike other choice variables for which the market determines feasible
(budget) sets, the feasible set of beliefs is presumably subjective (in the mind
of the agent) and thus invariably requires an ad hoc speci¯cation. A possi-
bly more important concern is the observability of chosen beliefs and hence
testability of the model. While in psychology it is standard to take beliefs as
observable through interviews or questionnaires, many economists adhere to
the choice-theoretic approach to beliefs, initiated by Savage, whereby beliefs
are observable only indirectly through choices among actions.
In this paper, we propose a choice-theoretic and axiomatic model of cog-
nitive dissonance. Preferences are de¯ned over actions (modeled formally by
menus) and axioms are imposed on these preferences. Thus empirical testa-
bility relies only on the ranking of actions being observable. The functional
form for utility admits an interpretation whereby the agent behaves as if she
chooses beliefs ex post in the manner described above, but this is a result
- part of the representation of preferences over actions. Finally, the above
question about the feasible set of beliefs is answered automatically by the
representation.
We emphasize that our agent is not boundedly rational or myopic. Rather
2she is sophisticated and forward-looking - when choosing an action ex ante
she is fully aware that she will later experience cognitive dissonance and that
this will a®ect her later decisions. She has this sophistication in common
with agents in most economic models, but one may wonder whether indi-
viduals outside those models are typically self-aware to this degree. We are
not familiar with de¯nitive evidence on this question and in its absence, we
are inclined to feel that full self-awareness is a plausible working hypothesis.
Even where the opposite extreme of complete naivete seems descriptively
more accurate, our model may help to clarify which economic consequences
are due to cognitive dissonance per se and which are due to naivete. In addi-
tion, the assumption of sophistication is vital for a choice-theoretic approach:
because she anticipates her cognitive dissonance, it a®ects her current choice
of actions. This makes it possible to infer cognitive dissonance from her (in
principle observable) choice of actions, consistent with the choice-theoretic
tradition of Savage. Thus sophistication seems justi¯able also on the method-
ological grounds of permitting the exploration of modest departures from
standard models.
1.2 Model Outline
As described above, cognitive dissonance implies changing beliefs, hence
changing preferences, which poses di±culties for modeling behavior. One
possible modeling route is to specify dynamically inconsistent preferences
and then to tackle the questions of to what degree the agent anticipates
future changes in preference and how intrapersonal con°icts are resolved.
These are the issues familiar from Strotz [33]. We follow instead the route
advocated by Gul and Pesendorfer [16] (henceforth GP) whereby behavior
that indicates changing preferences over underlying alternatives can alter-
natively be viewed as coming from stable preferences over menus of these
alternatives.
A brief outline is as follows: uncertainty is represented by the (¯nite)
state space S. Time varies over three periods. The true state is realized and
payo®s are received at the terminal time. The intermediate time is called the
ex post stage. Physical actions chosen then are identi¯ed with Anscombe-
Aumann acts, maps from S into lotteries over consumption. A physical
action is chosen also at the initial ex ante stage. Each such action is modeled
by a menu of acts - the idea is that any action taken ex ante limits options
ex post. The agent understands when choosing a menu that ex post she will
3choose an act from that menu. She also knows, when ranking menus, that
her beliefs about S will change ex post so as to make the previously chosen
menu seem more attractive. She will try to resist the temptation because she
views her prior beliefs, formed with the detachment a®orded by the ex ante
stage, as being `correct.' Whether or not she succeeds in exerting self-control,
however, temptation is costly, and this a®ects her ranking of menus. Thus
the latter reveals her expected change in beliefs, or her cognitive dissonance.
As a concrete illustration of the relevance of choice of menus and the
behavioral manifestation of cognitive dissonance, consider a job choice model
along the lines of Akerlof and Dickens [1]. Ex ante the worker chooses a job,
either in a hazardous industry or in a safe one. If he chooses the hazardous
industry, then ex post he can select between two kinds of safety equipment
(high quality h and low quality `). Each kind a®ects the likelihood of an
accident but may not eliminate the risk entirely. Thus h and ` each imply a
random payo®, net of cost of the equipment, that depends on the exogenous
state of the world. In other words, each can be viewed as an act and the job
corresponds to the menu fh;`g. For the safe industry, there are no choices to
be made ex post and the ultimate payo® is certain and given by c (a constant
act). Therefore, the safe industry corresponds to the singleton menu fcg and
the choice of job corresponds to the choice between the menus fh;`g and
fcg.
If the worker can commit to safety equipment at the same time that he
chooses the job, then ex ante beliefs are such that he would prefer the high
quality equipment, that is,
fhg Â f`g. (1)
In the standard model, menus are valued according to the best alternative
that they contain, and thus the worker would also exhibit the indi®erence
fhg » fh;`g.
However, an agent who exhibits cognitive dissonance, and knows this ex ante,
may exhibit the ranking
fhg Â fh;`g.
The intuition is as follows: after accepting the job in the hazardous industry,
the worker faces the two cognitions - \my job is dangerous" and \I am a smart
person and would not choose a precarious job". He relieves this dissonance,
and reduces doubts about his job choice, by changing his prior beliefs, as
4re°ected in the ex ante ranking (1), and believing instead that the job is
not so dangerous after all. This creates the temptation to choose ` rather
than h. The worker anticipates this temptation. Accordingly, if he dislikes
temptation, he would rank fh;`g as strictly worse than fhg.
If commitment to high quality equipment can be made simultaneously
with choice of the hazardous job, the worker would so commit. Because
that would leave no decisions left to be made ex post, cognitive dissonance
would not be behaviorally relevant. Assume that such commitment is not
possible (Akerlof and Dickens give reasons why commitment may not be
possible). Then there remains the question of whether given the menu fh;`g
ex post, he yields to the temptation and chooses `. He feels that his prior
beliefs were \correct" and thus \should" be used to guide decisions - in other
words, h is the correct choice. The balance between what he ought to do
and the tempting alternative depends on the worker's self-control. With high
self-control, he may resist the temptation and choose h. Following GP, we
suppose that this case (or rather the ex ante expectation thereof) is captured
by the ranking
fh;`g Â f`g.
The expectation of yielding and choosing ` is captured by the ranking
fh;`g » f`g. (2)
Rational expectations about cognitive dissonance may lead to choice of
the safe industry. However, if
fh;`g Â fcg,
then the worker chooses the hazardous industry and, assuming (2), later
adopts the poor safety equipment corresponding to `. To an outsider, or
from the perspective of (1), the worker may appear careless or overcon¯dent.
To this point, we have suggested that cognitive dissonance could explain
the ranking
fhg Â fh;`g º f`g. (3)
This ranking is a special case of GP's central axiom of Set-Betweenness.
While GP argue that such rankings reveal the presence of temptation and
self-control problems, the reason for temptation is unspeci¯ed. Put another
way, the ranking under commitment may con°ict with choice behavior out of
the menu available ex post, but the reason for this di®erence is not clear given
5only (3). For example, (3) could be due to underlying preferences (taste or
risk aversion) changing with the passage of time, rather than beliefs changing
in order to justify the previous choice of menu. But there is other behavior,
described via axioms in our formal model, that would exclude such interpre-
tations and support an interpretation in terms of cognitive dissonance.
1.3 Related Literature
It has been argued that a moderate degree of (optimistic) illusion can be
psychologically bene¯cial even net of the loss in e±cacy of decisions; see
Taylor and Brown [35], Taylor [34] and Baumeister [4], for example.
The psychological theory of cognitive dissonance is due to Festinger [13].
Dissonance originates with an action and the subsequent evaluation of that
action. Where there exists dissonance between having taken that action
and subsequent beliefs, the theory posits that those beliefs will be changed
to match or justify the past action. Aronson [3] is an excellent textbook
treatment and overview of the supporting evidence from psychology. Some
of this evidence is strongly suggestive that cognitive dissonance has economic
consequences; for example, the e±cacy of the \foot-in-the-door-technique",
whereby a small commitment by individuals makes it easier to persuade them
later to commit further in that direction, suggests the e±cacy of two-stage
mechanisms, possibly including an entry fee at the ¯rst stage. Several other
applications have been developed in formal economic models as we describe
below.
Akerlof and Dickens suggest that cognitive dissonance can play a role
in explaining some economic phenomena that are arguably puzzling from
the perspective of more standard models. These include the existence of
safety regulation (based on the job-choice model sketched above), why non-
informational advertising is e®ective (it gives external justi¯cation for an
individual to believe she is making a smart decision in buying the product),
and why persons often fail to purchase actuarially favorable disaster (°ood
or earthquake) insurance. The story here is analogous to that concerning
safety equipment and ¯ts naturally into our modeling approach: after choos-
ing a house (or menu), it reduces dissonance to believe that a °ood is so
unlikely as to not justify buying insurance (the choice of a particular act),
even though she would have bought insurance simultaneously with the house
purchase. Similarly, cognitive dissonance can explain why researchers may
appear \overly optimistic" in their pursuit of a previously chosen project (a
6menu). It feels good to believe that the research project previously embarked
on is a promising one and thus ongoing e®orts may be guided by otherwise
unwarranted optimism.
Rabin [28] models the choice of an enjoyable but immoral activity in
light of dissonance between one's beliefs about what is moral and the chosen
level of activity. Haagsma and Koning [17] show how cognitive dissonance
can generate barriers to exiting an unproductive industry. Smith [32] shows
how cognitive dissonance can explain why wages tend to rise faster than
productivity. The worker justi¯es his job situation ex post by adjusting his
beliefs about the cost of e®ort needed to ful¯ll his duties - the need for self-
justi¯cation, and the adjustment in beliefs, are greater the lower is his past
wage. The employer can exploit this by o®ering a contract with an increasing
wage pro¯le. Goetzmann and Peles [15] argue that cognitive dissonance
leads investors to justify remaining in mutual funds that consistently perform
poorly; and that such inertia can help to explain why money °ows in more
rapidly to mutual funds that have performed well than °ows out from those
that have performed poorly. See Dickens [8] and Oxoby [27] for further
applications of cognitive dissonance.
With regard to modeling, we have already acknowledged our debt to GP.
Their model does not apply directly, however. One di®erence is that while
they study preferences over menus of lotteries, it is important for our story
that menus consist of (Anscombe-Aumann) acts. Kopylov [19] has extended
the GP theorem from (menus of) lotteries to abstract mixture spaces, in-
cluding, in particular, the space of Anscombe-Aumann acts. A second and
more important formal di®erence from GP, and also from Kopylov's exten-
sion, and the major source of technical di±culty in our model, is that we
relax the Independence axiom - the latter is not intuitive given cognitive dis-
sonance. Finally, we note that Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini [7] generalize
GP's model of temptation. However, their motivation is much di®erent than
ours - in particular, they assume Independence.1
1In their concluding remarks about possible directions for further research, they men-
tion that accommodating guilt may be a reason for relaxing Independence when modeling
temptation. This rationale is obviously much di®erent than ours. There exist other repre-
sentation results in the menus-of-lotteries/acts setting that do not rely on Independence.
Epstein and Marinacci [11] study an agent who is not subject to temptation, but rather
values °exibility because she is uncertain about the future; she violates Independence
because her conception of the future is coarse. More recent results, with still di®erent
objectives, appear in Ergin and Sarver [12] and in Noor [26].
7There are two ¯nal but important connections to the literature. The
more optimistic beliefs held ex post by our agent come about in our model
because she uses a (nonsingleton) set of probability measures, and when
evaluating a prospect, she chooses the measure that maximizes its utility.
This recalls Dreze's [9] model of choice between Anscombe-Aumann acts
under moral hazard. It recalls also Gilboa and Schmeidler [14] - they model
agents who are averse to ambiguity, in the sense illustrated by the Ellsberg
Paradox, by assuming that they minimize (rather than maximize) over a set
of priors, but their model has an obvious counterpart for ambiguity loving.
Our model di®ers from both of these primarily through its focus on the time-
varying nature of beliefs and the corresponding value of commitment. In
principle, one could reinterpret our model in terms of a change from ex ante
probabilistic beliefs to ex post multiple-priors re°ecting ambiguity loving,
but then there is no apparent reason for the agent to exert self-control as she
does in our model. Thus we disregard this interpretation of the model.
2 UTILITY
The model has the following primitives:
² time t = 0;1;2
² ¯nite state space S
² C: set of (Borel) probability measures over a compact metric space
refer to c 2 C as a lottery over consumption, or more brie°y as con-
sumption
C is compact metric under the weak convergence topology
² H: set of acts h : S ¡! C, with the usual mixture operation
² compact sets of acts are called menus and denoted A; B; :::
K(H) is the set of all menus
it is compact metric under the Hausdor® metric2
² preference º de¯ned on K(H)
2See [2, Theorem 3.58], for example.
8The interpretation is that a menu A is chosen ex ante (at time 0) according
to º. This choice is made with the understanding that at the unmodeled
ex post stage (time 1), the agent will choose an act from A. Uncertainty is
resolved and consumption is realized in the terminal period t = 2. Cognitive
dissonance and choice behavior at time 1 are anticipated ex ante and underlie
the ranking º.
Menus are natural objects of choice.3 The consequence of a physical
action taken at time 0 is that it determines a feasible set of physical actions
at time 1, and these actions can be modeled by acts in the usual way. Thus
each physical action at time 0 corresponds to a menu of acts.
Our model of utility has the form4
U (A) = max
h2A
[(1 ¡ ·)U (h) + ·V (h)] ¡ ·max
h02A
V (h
0), (4)
where
U (h) = p ¢ u(h), and (5)
V (h) = max
q2Q
q ¢ u(h). (6)
Here 0 · · · 1, p is a probability measure on S, Q is a closed and convex
set of probability measures on S containing p, and u : C ¡! R1 is mixture
linear and continuous.
The standard model of subjective expected utility maximization is the
special case where · = 0 or Q = fpg. More generally, the functional form can
be interpreted along the lines suggested by GP. When restricted to singletons,
U coincides (ordinally) with U; thus expected utility with prior p represents
preference over consumption lotteries when the agent can commit ex ante.
When she does not commit, then the new (temptation) utility function V over
lotteries becomes relevant. Temptation utility is computed by maximizing
over probability measures in the set Q. Since p 2 Q, V imputes higher
expected utility to the menu at hand than was the case ex ante using p,
corresponding to cognitive dissonance. She is tempted to maximize V ex
post. Though she views p as \correct", there is a self-control cost of resisting
3Kreps [21, 23] was the ¯rst to propose menus as a way to model physical actions in
an ex ante stage.
4For any real-valued random variable x on S, and probability measure q, q ¢x is short-
hand for the expected value
R
S xdq.
9the temptation given by
·
µ
V (h) ¡ max
h02A
V (h
0)
¶
· 0.
Thus a compromise is struck between maximizing U and maximizing V -
choice out of A is described by maximization of the weighted sum, or by
solving
max
h2A
max
q2(1¡·)fpg+·Q
q ¢ u(h). (7)
which balances ex ante realism and ex post cognitive dissonance. The nature
of the compromise is further illustrated by the fact that
p 2 (1 ¡ ·)fpg + ·Q ½ Q,
so that the set of beliefs underlying the choice of an act ex post lies \between"
the prior view p and the optimistic view represented by Q.5
Since ex post choice out of the menu maximizes the utility function
maxq2(1¡·)fpg+·Q q¢u(h), which does not depend on the menu, one may won-
der whether the model captures beliefs that adjust to make the previously
chosen menu attractive. To see a sense in which this is true, note that (by
reversing the order of the maximizations),
max
h2A
max
q2(1¡·)fpg+·Q
q ¢ u(h) = max
h2A
q
¤
A ¢ u(h),
for any q¤
A that solves maxq2(1¡·)fpg+·Q maxh2A q ¢ u(h). Thus ex post choice
conforms with SEU and probabilistic beliefs given by q¤
A. Evidently, q¤
A de-
pends on the menu A and is chosen to make the value of the menu, given by
maxh2A q ¢ u(h), as large as possible.
We can say something about the qualitative di®erence between ex post
choice and the \correct" choice. Given any menu A ex post, the choice out of
A is determined by maximizing maxq2(1¡·)fpg+·Q q¢u(h), while the \correct"
choice would maximize p ¢ u(h). Suppose for concreteness that consumption
is real-valued (C consists of lotteries over [a;b] ½ R1) - typically, one assumes
that u(¢) is concave on [a;b] corresponding to risk aversion. On the other
5As is familiar from GP-style models, this interpretation in terms of ex post choice is
suggested by the functional form, and by intuition for the underlying axioms, but ex post
choice lies outside the scope of our formal model. See Noor [25] for a model of temptation
where ex post choice is part of the primitives.
10hand, the maximization over q in the ex post utility function introduces some
convexity. Thus it may not be concave in h and may even exhibit risk loving.
(For example, if one restricts attention to Savage acts h : S ! [a;b], then
ex post utility is a convex function of h if u is linear.) Consequently, ex
post choice may appear extreme - for example, it may correspond more to
boundary optima.
A ¯nal comment is that both subjective and objective probabilities are
present in the model - the latter underlie consumption lotteries - but they
are treated di®erently: while the agent chooses new beliefs ex post about her
subjective uncertainty (the state space S), she does not distort or modify ob-
jective probabilities. For example, both U and V agree about the ranking of
lotteries in that, for every lottery c, U (c) = V (c) = u(c), the vNM expected
utility of c. Because an objective probability law is based on undeniable fact,
distorting it to a more favorable one, is folly or ignorance that would not
be undertaken by the sophisticated individuals that we model. But where
facts alone do not pin down beliefs uniquely, an agent is free to choose be-
liefs and feeling good about oneself is one possible consideration in doing so.
As an illustration of the di®erence, note that Knox and Inkster [18] report
that persons leaving the betting window after placing bets at a race-track
are more optimistic about \their horse" than persons about to place bets.
On the other hand, it is more di±cult to imagine someone being similarly
optimistic about a coin, which is known to be unbiased, after choosing that
coin for a game of chance.
3 AXIOMS
The ¯rst two axioms require no discussion.
Axiom 1 (Order) º is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Continuity) º is continuous.
Menus can be mixed via
®A + (1 ¡ ®)B = f®f + (1 ¡ ®)g : f 2 A; g 2 Bg.
Formally, the indicated mixture of A and B is another menu and thus when
the agent contemplates that menu ex ante, she anticipates choosing out of
11®A+(1 ¡ ®)B ex post. It follows that one should think of the randomization
corresponding to the ® and (1 ¡ ®) weights as taking place at the end - after
she has chosen some mixed act ®f +(1 ¡ ®)g out of the menu. In fact, since
the mixture of acts is de¯ned by (®f + (1 ¡ ®)g)(s) = ®f (s)+(1 ¡ ®)g (s)
for each s, the randomization occurs after realization of the state.
The above mixture operation permits one to state the Independence ax-
iom, which is adopted by GP. However, Independence is not intuitive under
cognitive dissonance.6 To see this, suppose for concreteness that A » B and
consider whether the mixture ®A+(1 ¡ ®)B should also be indi®erent to A
as required by Independence. Indi®erence between A and B is based on the
anticipation that, in each case, the agent will choose beliefs ex post to make
the menu in hand attractive, and that these beliefs will tempt her to choose
out of the given menu di®erently from what she would have prescribed ex
ante. Evaluation of the mixture ®A+(1 ¡ ®)B can be thought of similarly,
but the important point is that beliefs for the mixed menu must be chosen
before the randomization is played out. Since also beliefs chosen given A
generally di®er from those chosen given B, optimistic beliefs for the mixed
menu bear no simple relation to those for A and B. A similar disconnect
applies to anticipated temptation and ex post choices across the three menus.
For example, it is possible that the acts f and g be chosen out of A and B
respectively, while ®f + (1 ¡ ®)g not be chosen out of ®A + (1 ¡ ®)B. As
a result, the agent will generally not be indi®erent between the mixed menu
and A, violating Independence. (The deviation from indi®erence could go
in either direction: ®A + (1 ¡ ®)B Â A and ®A + (1 ¡ ®)B Á A are both
possible.)
However, suitable relaxations of Independence are intuitive. To proceed,
for any act f 2 H, let
Hf = ftc + (1 ¡ t)f : t 2 [0;1]; c 2 Cg:
If h = tc+(1¡t)f is an act in Hf, then for any mixture linear u and for all
probability measures q,
q ¢ u(h) = tu(c) + (1 ¡ t)q ¢ u(f).
6The reason is essentially that because the agent anticipates that she will adjust her
beliefs ex post to the menu at hand, the situation is analogous to that of choice between
\temporal risks". As explained by Machina [24], for example, preferences over temporal
risks typically violate Independence even at a normative level.
12Because the ¯rst term on the right is independent of q, it follows that any
menu A that is a subset of Hf is rendered attractive by beliefs that make
f attractive. In particular, for any two menus A and B in Hf, when the
agent chooses beliefs to ¯t the menu, there is an optimistic measure that is
common to both A and B. But this invalidates the reason given above for
violating Independence. Thus we adopt:
Axiom 3 (Collinear Independence) For all ® 2 (0;1), for all f 2 H,
and for all menus A0;A;B ½ Hf,
A
0 Â A =) ®A
0 + (1 ¡ ®)B Â ®A + (1 ¡ ®)B:
Acts h0 and h in Hf are naturally called collinear, which explains the name
of the axiom.7
When ranking singleton menus, there is no choice to be made ex post.
Thus cognitive dissonance is not relevant and there is no reason for Inde-
pendence to be violated. This motivates the following second relaxation of
Independence:
Axiom 4 (Commitment Independence) For all f;g;h 2 H and ® 2
(0;1),
ffg Â fgg =) f®f + (1 ¡ ®)hg Â f®g + (1 ¡ ®)hg.
In the standard model, a menu is as good as the best alternative that it
contains. Then
A º B =) A » A [ B,
a property called strategic rationality by Kreps [22]. Such a model excludes
temptation. Temptation is an integral part of cognitive dissonance because
the agent changes beliefs to make the menu at hand look attractive and then
is tempted to make subsequent choices accordingly (see the discussion of
utility in Section 2). In seeking a suitable relaxation of strategic rationality,
we begin with GP's central axiom Set-Betweenness.
7For any collinear acts h0 and h, it is easy to see that for every s0 and s,
u(h0 (s0)) > u(h0 (s)) =) u(h(s0)) ¸ u(h(s)), that is, the real-valued func-
tions u(h(¢)) and u(h0 (¢)) are comonotonic. Collinearity implies the stronger restriction
(1 ¡ t)(u(h0 (s0)) ¡ u(h0 (s))) = (1 ¡ t0)(u(h(s0)) ¡ u(h(s))) for some t and t0. Thus
collinearity can be viewed as a cardinal counterpart of comonotonicity.
13Set-Betweenness (SB): For all menus A and A0, if A º A0, then A º A[A0 º
A0:
An equivalent and perhaps more revealing, though less compact statement
is that if A º A0, then one of the following conditions holds: (i) A » A[A0 »
A0,
or (ii) A Â A [ A0 Â A0, or (iii) A » A [ A0 Â A0, or (iv) A Â A [ A0 » A0.
Following GP (p. 1408), we may interpret these conditions intuitively.
The underlying assumptions are that: unchosen acts can only reduce utility,
acts can be ranked according to how tempting they are, and only the most
tempting act a®ects utility. Consider an agent having the menu A [ A0, and
who expects to choose g though she ¯nds f most tempting. (i) is the residual
case. (ii) indicates that g is in A0 (hence A Â A [ A0), and that f is in A
(hence A [ A0 Â A0). The next two cases are our main interest.
In (iii), she still plans to choose out of A which now also contains the
most tempting act. Confront her next with the larger menu A[A0[B. The
most tempting act lies in A [ B. What about her choice out of A [ A0 [ B?
Suppose that her expected choices satisfy the Nash-Cherno® condition (or
Sen's property ®); defer discussion of possible objections to this assumption.
Then having rejected acts in A0 when facing A [ A0, she would (expect to)
reject them also when facing A [ A0 [ B. Thus A [ B contains both the
act to be chosen and also the act in A [ A0 [ B that is most tempting. The
indi®erence A [ B » A [ A0 [ B follows.
Finally, consider (iv), which indicates that both f and g lie in A0. Again
confront the agent with the larger menu A[A0 [B. The most tempting act
lies in B [A0 and, assuming the Nash-Cherno® condition, so does the act to
be chosen. Deduce the indi®erence A0 [ B » A [ A0 [ B.
The preceding provides intuition for the following axiom:
Axiom 5 (Strong Set-Betweenness (SSB)) For all menus A and A0, if
A º A0, then: (i) A » A [ A0 » A0, or (ii) A Â A [ A0 Â A0, or
(iii) A [ A0 Â A0 and A [ B » A [ A0 [ B for all menus B, or
(iv) A Â A [ A0 and A0 [ B » A [ A0 [ B for all menus B.
SSB implies Set-Betweenness: let B = A in (iii) and B = A0 in (iv). The
two axioms are equivalent given Independence (and Order and Continuity)
- this follows from counterparts of the representation results in GP [16] and
14Kopylov [19] - and thus SSB is not invoked explicitly in those papers. How-
ever, we do not adopt Independence, and we show below that SSB is strictly
stronger than Set-Betweenness even given all our other axioms.
Our intuition for SSB assumed the Nash-Cherno® condition, which does
not appear in GP's rationale for Set-Betweenness. The Nash-Cherno® condi-
tion can be criticized in a model of temptation - the addition of the acts in B
should not a®ect the normative appeal of A versus A0, but it may change the
self-control costs associated with various choices, and this may lead to the
choice of an act in A0 when facing A[B[A0 even where she chooses an act in
A when facing A[A0. The Nash-Cherno® condition is weaker than the weak
axiom of revealed preference (WARP), which requires also Sen's condition ¯
(see [22]). Noor [25] provides an example to illustrate why WARP may be
problematic in a model of temptation, and in [26] he develops a model of
temptation and self-control that does not impose WARP for ex post choice.
Note, however, that since SSB and WARP for ex post choice are implied
when one assumes also Independence, such objections apply equally to the
GP model. Moreover, while they may be important for guiding development
of a general model of temptation, they do not seem germane to temptation
generated by cognitive dissonance.
One can raise other objections to Set-Betweenness, and hence a fortiori
to our stronger axiom. Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini [7] argue that Set-
Betweenness excludes some forms of temptation, for example, where the
temptation generated by di®erent alternatives is cumulative, or where there is
uncertainty ex ante about which alternatives will be tempting. Once again,
we do not view these objections as especially relevant for cognitive disso-
nance.
Say that f 2 H dominates g 2 H if ff (s)g º fg (s)g for every s 2 S. If
the evaluation of a lottery does not depend on the state, then a dominating
act should be preferred under commitment. Similarly, if f dominates g , we
would not expect f to be tempted by g. Thus we assume:
Axiom 6 (Monotonicity) If f dominates g, then ffg » ff;gg º fgg.
Our axioms thus far have for the most part been concerned with modeling
temptation in general, that is, not tied speci¯cally to cognitive dissonance.
A partial exception is Collinear Independence, the intuition for which did
15rely on the assumption that temptation arises because of an ex post choice
of beliefs to \¯t the menu" in hand. However, Collinear Independence is
satis¯ed even if the agent becomes more pessimistic ex post and adopts beliefs
that make the menu less attractive ex post. The ¯nal two axioms build in
ex post optimism and hence cognitive dissonance.
Axiom 7 (Constants-Do-Not-Tempt) For all c 2 C and f 2 H,
ffg Â fcg =) ffg » fc;fg:
Temptation is due to a change in beliefs (as opposed to a change in risk
aversion, for example), which leaves the evaluation of constant acts unaf-
fected. In addition, the noted change is always to become more optimistic
ex post about the available menu, rendering it even more attractive relative
to any constant act c than it was ex ante. Therefore, constant acts cannot
tempt. Note that, in contrast, fcg Â fc;fg º ffg is both permitted by the
axiom and intuitive given our story.
Axiom 8 (Convex Temptation) The set ff 2 H : fcg » fc;fg Â ffgg
is convex for every c 2 C.
Suppose that f and g both lie in the indicated set, that is, each is worse
than c under commitment and neither tempts c, and consider the mixture
®f + (1 ¡ ®)g. By Commitment Independence, fcg Â f®f + (1 ¡ ®)gg.
We now argue that in addition, ®f + (1 ¡ ®)g should not tempt c, thus
completing intuition for the axiom. We are given that fcg » fc;fg. Because
ex post beliefs are chosen to make the menu fc;fg attractive, and because
the expected utility of c does not depend on beliefs, we can interpret the
indicated indi®erence as follows: the act f, when matched with the beliefs
that make it attractive, does not tempt c. A similar statement applies for
g. Consider now the menu fc;®f + (1 ¡ ®)gg. Beliefs to render this menu
attractive are chosen ex post (time 1), before the randomization is completed
(which, as noted earlier, occurs only at the terminal time after the true state
in S is realized). Since the beliefs that make f attractive may di®er from
those that make g attractive, matching beliefs with the mixed act is more
di±cult. Therefore, one would expect the mixed act not to tempt c.
164 REPRESENTATION RESULT
Our main result is that the preceding axioms characterize the functional form
described in Section 2.
Theorem 4.1 The binary relation º on K(H) may be represented as in
(4)-(6) if and only if it satis¯es Axioms 1-8. Moreover, u is unique up to a
positive linear transformation, and if º is not strategically rational, then p,
Q and · are unique.
Convex Temptation is used only at the very end of the su±ciency proof
in order to prove that V has the form given in (6). If the axiom is deleted,
then the remaining axioms characterize the representation (4)-(5), for some
V : H ! R1 that is continuous, monotone (V (f) ¸ V (g) if f dominates g),
satis¯es certainty additivity (V (®f + (1 ¡ ®)c) = ®V (f)+(1 ¡ ®)V (c) for
all c in C), and that satis¯es V (f) ¸ p ¢ u(f) for all f with equality if f is
constant. (See Example 3 below.)
We present some examples to demonstrate the tightness of the charac-
terization in the theorem. Each of the ¯rst three examples satis¯es Order,
Continuity, Commitment Independence, Strong Set-Betweenness and Mono-
tonicity, and violates precisely one of the axioms that relate more speci¯-
cally to cognitive dissonance - Collinear Independence, Constants-Do-Not-
Tempt and Convex Temptation. The ¯nal example violates only Strong Set-
Betweenness, though it satis¯es GP's Set-Betweenness, thus proving that our
adoption of the stronger axiom is necessary.
Example 1: Let
U (A) =
maxh2A [U (h)V (h)]
maxh02A V (h0)
,
where U and V are as in (5)-(6), and where u > 0. Then º violates only
Collinear Independence. (See Appendix C for some details.)
There exist simpler examples violating only Collinear Independence -
these retain (4)-(5) but modify the speci¯cation of V . However, because
the above ratio form deviates from the GP functional form, we ¯nd it more
revealing about the power of Collinear Independence.8
8The example is inspired by weighted utility theory [5], a model of risk preference
in which the utility function over lotteries equals a ratio of expected utility functions.
Readers familiar with the `non-expected utility' literature will not be surprised by the
17Example 2: Assume (4)-(5), but take
V (h) = q ¢ u(h),
for some probability measure q 6= p. Then º violates only Constants-Do-
Not-Tempt.
Example 3: Modify Example 2 by taking
V (h) = max
½
p ¢ u(f);
Z
u(f)dº
¾
,
where º is a capacity on S and the integral
R
u(f)dº is in the sense of
Choquet (see Schmeidler [31]). Then º violates only Convex Temptation.
Example 4: This example violates only SSB. Let S = fs1;s2g, and ¯x a
vNM utility function u such that u(C) = [0;1]. For every f 2 H, let u1(f) =
u(f(s1)), u2(f) = u(f(s2)), and
º(f) = maxf0;u1(f) ¡ u2(f) ¡ 4
5g;
°(f) = maxf0;u2(f) ¡ u1(f) ¡ 4
5g:
Let º be represented by U, where, for all menus A,
U(A) = max
f2A
[u2(f) ¡ °(f)max
g2A
º(g)].
Then º satis¯es Order and Continuity. By construction, °(f)º(f) = 0 for
all f, so that U(ffg) = u2 (f), implying Commitment Independence. In
addition, °(f)º(g) = 0 holds in each of the following cases (i) f or g are
constant; (ii) f and g are collinear; (iii) f dominates g; (iv) g dominates f.9
Thus º satis¯es Collinear Independence, Monotonicity, Constants-Do-Not-
Tempt, and Convex Temptation. For Set-Betweenness, take any menus A
and B and the acts f;g 2 A [ B that deliver the maxima in the de¯nition
of U(A [ B), so that U(A [ B) = u2 (f) ¡ ° (f)º (g). Wlog f 2 A. Then
U(A) = U(A[B) if g 2 A, and U(A) ¸ U(A[B) ¸ U(B) if g 2 B. However,
observation that º satis¯es the following alternative relaxation of Independence: A »
B =) ®A + (1 ¡ ®)B » A.
9If ° (f) ¢ º(g) > 0, then: u1 (f); u2 (g) < 1=5 and u2 (f); u1 (g) > 4=5. But this is
impossible given any of the conditions (i)-(iv).
18º violates SSB: if u1(f) = 0; u2(f) = 1, u1(g) = 0; u2(g) = 1
2, u1(h) = 1 and
u2(h) = 0, then U(ffg) = U(ff;gg) = 1 > U(ff;g;hg) = 24
25 > U(fgg) =
U(fg;hg) = 1
2 > U(fhg) = 0.
A tuple (u;p;Q;·) as in the theorem is said to represent º. The repre-
senting tuple is unique (up to cardinal equivalence for u) if the degenerate
case of strategic rationality is excluded. Thus it is meaningful to ask about
behavioral interpretations of its components. We have already noted those of
u and p: u ranks lotteries (constant acts) and p is the \commitment prior"
- it underlies the ranking of singleton menus. Turn to Q and ·. In what
follows, we adopt variants of GP's comparative notions \greater preference
for commitment" and \greater self-control", renamed so as to re°ect better
the psychological motives we have in mind.
Say that º¤ has greater dissonance than º if for all acts f and g,
ffg Â ff;gg =) ffg Â
¤ ff;gg. (8)
The ranking ffg Â ff;gg indicates that though f is better than g ex ante, g is
better ex post when holding the menu ff;gg. Then there is dissonance for the
agent with preference º between the ex ante ranking under commitment (or
the underlying beliefs) and the distinct ex post ranking (or ex post beliefs).
If º¤ has greater dissonance, then she should strictly prefer ffg to ff;gg.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose that both º and º¤ have utility representations (4)-
(6), with components (u;p;Q;·) and (u¤;p¤;Q¤;·¤) respectively, and that
neither is strategically rational. Then º¤ has greater dissonance than º if
and only if
(u;p) = (au
¤ + b;p
¤) for some a > 0 and some b, and (9)
Q = (1 ¡ ²)fpg + ²Q
¤, for some 0 < ² · 1. (10)
The characterizing conditions assert both that the commitment rankings
induced by º and º¤ coincide (this is (9)) and that Q is \closer to p" than is
Q¤ in the sense of an epsilon contamination (this is (10)). Since Q¤ is convex
and contains p, (10) implies in particular that Q ½ Q¤, but it implies more.
Note that if º is strategically rational, then any º¤ has greater dissonance
19- the de¯ning condition is satis¯ed vacuously - and no restrictions on com-
mitment preferences are implied. If º¤ is strategically rational, then (8) is
satis¯ed if and only if º is also strategically rational, and again, condition
(9) is not implied.
We are interested not only in how much dissonance an agent experiences
(or expects to experience), but also in what she does about it, or more
precisely, in the extent to which ex post choices are distorted by dissonance.
Say that º¤ is more self-justifying than º if it has more dissonance than º
and
ffg Â ff;gg » fgg =) ffg Â
¤ ff;gg »
¤ fgg.
The hypothesized rankings for º indicate not only that there is dissonance
but also that given ff;gg at the ex post stage, the agent succumbs and
chooses g; even though f was optimal ex ante under commitment. She does
this because the choice of g better justi¯es her previous choice of ff;gg. If
º¤ is more self-justifying, then she should also choose g out of ff;gg.
Theorem 4.3 Suppose that both º and º¤ have utility representations (4)-
(6), with components (u;p;Q;·) and (u¤;p¤;Q¤;·¤) respectively, and that
neither is strategically rational. Then º¤ is more self-justifying than º if
and only if (u¤;p¤;Q¤;·¤) and (u;p;Q;·) satisfy (9), (10) and ·¤ ¸ ²·.
It follows that a change from · to ·¤ > ·, keeping other components of
the functional form ¯xed, renders º¤ more self-justifying than º but leaves
the two preference orders equally dissonant (each has greater dissonance than
the other).
5 EXTENSIONS
To conclude, we outline two generalizations of the above model.10
5.1 E®ort and Dissonance
An intuitive prediction of dissonance theory is that cognitive dissonance is
more pronounced when past actions are \di±cult". As Aronson writes (p.
175), \if a person works hard to attain a goal, that goal will be more attractive
10The extensions are in terms of functional forms. We have not provided axiomatic
foundations, though we believe it would be straightforward to do so.
20to the individual than it will be to someone who achieves the same goal with
little or no e®ort." See [3, pp. 175-8] and [1, p. 310] for discussion and
references to supporting experimental evidence. Here we outline an extension
of the model that can accommodate this prediction.
Modify the time line described in Section 2 only by supposing that the
choice to made at the ex ante stage is of a pair (e0;A), where e0 2 E denotes
e®ort in period 0 and A is, as before, a menu of Anscombe-Aumann acts one
of which will be chosen in the following period. Ex ante choices are assumed
to maximize preference º, which is de¯ned on E £ K(H).
Let utility have the form
U (e0;A) = max
h2A
h
U (e0;h) +
·(e0)
1¡·(e0) V (e0;h)
i
¡
·(e0)
1¡·(e0) max
h02A
V (e0;h
0), (11)
where
U (e0;h) = ¡v (e0) + ± p ¢ u(h), and (12)
V (e0;h) = ¡v (e0) + ± max
q2Q
q ¢ u(h). (13)
Here 0 · ·(e0) < 1, p is a probability measure on S, Q is a convex and
compact set of probability measures on S containing p, u : C ¡! R1 is
mixture linear and continuous, v : E ! R1 gives the utility cost of e®ort, and
0 < ± < 1 is a discount factor. When restricted to singletons,
U (e0;fhg) = ¡v (e0) + ±p ¢ u(h).
For nonsingletons, ex post choice out of A solves
max
h2A
max
q2(1¡·(e0))fpg+·(e0)Q
q ¢ u(h),
which depends on e0 via ·(¢).
Suppose that
·(e0) = b ·(v (e0)),
where b ·(¢) is increasing. Then an increase in v(e0), corresponding to greater
e®ort, renders the agent more self-justifying, but leaves the level of dissonance
unchanged.11 More generally, we could also specify Q as a function of v(e0),
for example,
Q = (1 ¡ ²(v(e0)))fpg + ²(v(e0))¢(S).
11We are using the formal comparative notions de¯ned in the preceding section applied
to the preferences on K(H) induced by º and the two levels of consumption.
21If b ·(¢)²(¢) is increasing, then greater e®ort implies both greater dissonance
and greater self-justi¯cation.12
5.2 Response to Information
The justi¯cation of a past decision may also in°uence the reaction to in-
formation - dissonance theory predicts that information is interpreted in a
way that is favorable to past choices. By adding a signal realized at time 1
and building on Epstein [10], we can extend our model to capture also the
response to information.
An outline of the model is as follows: let S1 denote the (¯nite) space
of signals, one of which is realized at time 1. Ex ante, the agent chooses
a contingent menu - a mapping F from signals into menus of Anscombe-
Aumann acts. At time 1, she observes the realized signal, updates her beliefs
about S, and then chooses an act from the realized menu F (s1). Denote by
p prior beliefs on S1 £ S, by p1 its ¯rst marginal, and, for each signal s1,
let Qs1 be a (closed and convex) set of probability measures on S containing
p(¢ j s1), the Bayesian update of p. Then the utility of any contingent menu
F is given by
W (F) =
Z
S1
U (F (s1);s1) dp1 (s1),
where, for any menu A,
U (A;s1) = max
h2A
[(1 ¡ ·)U (h;s1) + ·V (h;s1)] ¡ ·max
h02A
V (h
0;s1),
U (h;s1) = p(¢ j s1) ¢ u(h), and
V (h) = max
q2Qs1
q ¢ u(h).
The interpretation is clear given the parallel with our model (4)-(6). The key
is that at the ex post stage, the agent does not rely simply on the Bayesian
update p(¢ j s1) of her prior beliefs, but rather behaves as though she adjusts
the latter in a direction that renders the realized menu F (s1) attractive, as
indicated by the maximization over Qs1. As a result the signal is interpreted
so as to justify the past choice of an action (that is, F).13
12If Qi = (1 ¡ ²i)fpg+²i¢(S), i = 1;2, with ²1 ¸ ²2, then Q2 = (1 ¡ ²)fpg+²Q1 with
² = ²2=²1. Thus Theorem 4.3 implies that preference 1 is more self-justifying (and has
greater dissonance) than preference 2 if ²1·1 ¸ ²2·2.
13A closely related bias, called con¯rmatory bias, states that people tend to interpret
22A Appendix: Proof of the Representation The-
orem
For necessity, veri¯cation of the axioms is straightforward.
The proof of su±ciency proceeds roughly as follows: apply the Anscombe-Aumann
Theorem to derive an expected utility function U : H ! R1 for preference restricted to
singleton menus. This delivers a linear utility index u : C ! R1 and a prior p on S, such
that U (f) = p ¢ u(f). Next, for any f 2 H, let
Hf = ftc + (1 ¡ t)f : t 2 [0;1];c 2 Cg,
and let Af be the class of menus in Hf. Then Hf is a compact mixture space, and º
restricted to Af satis¯es Independence (because º satis¯es Collinear Independence) and
Set-Betweenness. Thus, by Kopylov's [19, Theorem 2.1] extension of GP's theorem to
mixture spaces, one obtains a continuous and linear function Vf : Hf ! R such that
U(A) = max
h2A
(U(h) + Vf(h)) ¡ max
h2A
Vf(h)
represents º on Af. The critical step is to extend the local functions Vf to a global
temptation function V . The remaining step is to show that V has the form (6) for some Q,
which is done by analogy with the proof of Gilboa and Schmeidler [14] (suitably modi¯ed
for the maxmax model rather than maxmin).
Turn to the detailed proof. Throughout abbreviate the domain K(H) by A, and
assume that º is non-degenerate, that is, A Â B for some A;B 2 A. (Otherwise, the
desired representation holds trivially with u ´ 0.)
Lemma A.1 There exist a continuous function U : A ! R, a probability measure p on
S, and a non-constant expected utility function u : C ! R such that U represents º and
U(ffg) = p ¢ u(f) for all f 2 H: (14)
Such p is unique, and u is unique up to a positive linear transformation.
Proof. By the Anscombe{Aumann Theorem, the axioms of Order, Continuity, Mono-
tonicity, and Commitment Independence imply that the preference º restricted to sin-
gleton menus can be represented by U(ffg) = p ¢ u(f), where p is a probability measure
on S, and u : C ! R is a continuous vNM expected utility function. As C is compact,
there exist lotteries c+;c¡ 2 C such that u(c+) ¸ u(c) ¸ u(c¡) for all c 2 C. Then
fc+g º ffg º fc¡g for all f 2 H. By Set-Betweenness, fc+g º A º fc¡g for all ¯nite
menus A; by Continuity, fc+g º A º fc¡g for all menus A 2 A. As º is non-degenerate,
fc+g Â fc¡g and hence, u is non-constant.
evidence in ways that con¯rm prior beliefs, as opposed to past actions (see [29], for exam-
ple).
23By Continuity, for any A 2 A, there exists a unique ® 2 [0;1] such that A » f®c+ +
(1 ¡ ®)c¡g. Let
U(A) = u(®c+ + (1 ¡ ®)c¡):
Then U represents º on A and inherits continuity from º. ¤
Hereafter, ¯x c+;c¡ 2 C as in the proof of the above lemma, and ¯x the unique u (and
the unique corresponding U) such that u(c+) = 1 and u(c¡) = ¡1. Let c0 =
c++c¡
2 ; then
u(c0) = 0.
For every act f 2 H, let
² U(f) = U(ffg) = p ¢ u(f)
² e(f) =
1+U(f)
2 c+ +
1¡U(f)
2 c¡; then e(f) 2 C and ffg » fe(f)g
² f + ® = ®c+ + (1 ¡ ®)f and f ¡ ® = ®c¡ + (1 ¡ ®)f
Take an arbitrary act f 2 H and invoke [19, Theorem 2.1]: Hf is a compact mixture
space satisfying properties M1{M4 in [19], and º restricted to Af satis¯es Order, Conti-
nuity, Binary Independence, and Set-Betweenness, the axioms in the cited theorem. Thus
º can be represented on Af by
Uf(A) = max
g2A
(Uf(g) + Vf(g)) ¡ max
g2A
Vf(g);
where Uf : Hf ! R and Vf : Hf ! R are continuous and linear functions normalized by
Uf(c+) = 1 and Uf(c0) = Vf(c0) = 0. The normalization of Uf implies that Uf ´ u ´ U
on C ½ Hf, and hence, Uf ´ U on Hf. It follows that Uf ´ U on Af. (To see this, for any
A in Af, let e(A) 2 C satisfy A » fe(A)g. Then U (A) = u(e(A)) = Uf (e(A)) = Uf (A).)
Thus
U(A) = max
g2A
(U(g) + Vf(g)) ¡ max
g2A
Vf(g) = max
g2A
Wf(g) ¡ max
g2A
Vf(g); (15)
where Wf(¢) = U(¢) + Vf(¢) on Hf.
Show that Vf is monotonic. Take any h;h0 2 Hf such that h dominates h0. For all
® 2 (0;1), Monotonicity and Lemma A.1 imply fh+®g » fh+®;h0 ¡®g Â fh0 ¡®g and
hence, Vf(h + ®) ¸ Vf(h0 ¡ ®). Let ® ! 0; then Vf(h) ¸ Vf(h0) by Continuity.
Say that f 2 H is never tempting if fc;fg º fcg for all c 2 C; otherwise call f
potentially tempting.
Lemma A.2 If f 2 H is never tempting, then Vf(f)Vf(e(f)), and U(A) = maxg2A U(g)
for all A 2 Af.
If f 2 H is potentially tempting, then Vf(f) > Vf(e(f)), the representation (15) is
unique, and there exists a unique ·f 2 (0;1) such that Vf(c) =
·f
1¡·f U(c) for all c 2 C.
Proof. The act f must satisfy exactly one of the following three cases.
Case 1. Vf(f) = Vf(e(f)). The linearity of Vf and U imply that Vf(g) = Vf(e(g)) for
all g 2 Hf. By monotonicity of Vf, for all A 2 Af,
max
g2A
(U(g) + Vf(g)) = max
g2A
U(g) + max
g2A
Vf(g);
24that is, U(A) = maxg2A U(g). Thus º satis¯es Strategic Rationality on Af, and f is never
tempting.
Case 2. Vf(f) > Vf(e(f)). The monotonicity of Vf implies that Vf(c+) ¸ Vf(f) >
Vf(e(f)), and that for all c;c0 2 C, if fcg º fc0g, then Vf(c) ¸ Vf(c0). By the vNM
theorem, Vf is a positive linear transformation of U on C. As U(c0) = Vf(c0) = 0, there
exists a unique ·f 2 (0;1) such that Vf(¢) =
·f
1¡·f U(¢) on C. The inequality Vf(c+) ¸
Vf(f) > Vf(e(f)) implies further that U(c+) > U(e(f)) and
1 ¸
Vf(f)¡Vf(e(f))
Vf(c+)¡Vf(e(f)) >
Vf(f)¡Vf(e(f))
Vf(c+)¡Vf(e(f))+U(c+)¡U(e(f)) =
Wf(f)¡Wf(e(f))
Wf(c+)¡Wf(e(f)) > 0: (16)
Take any ® 2 (0;1) such that
Vf(f)¡Vf(e(f))
Vf(c+)¡Vf(e(f)) > ® >
Wf(f)¡Wf(e(f))
Wf(c+)¡Wf(e(f)). Then Wf(e(f)+®) >
Wf(f) and Vf(f) > Vf(e(f) + ®) because Wf and Vf are linear. By (15), fe(f) + ®g Â
fe(f) + ®;fg Â ffg: This ranking implies that f is potentially tempting, and by [19,
Theorem 2.1], that the representation (15) on Hf is unique.
Case 3. Vf(e(f)) > Vf(f). Then by Continuity, there exists ® such that Vf(e(f)¡®) >
Vf(f+®). By (15), ff+®g Â ff+®;e(f)¡®g º fe(f)¡®g, which contradicts Constants-
Do-Not-Tempt. So this case is impossible.
It follows that f is never tempting if and only if Case 1 holds, and f is potentially
tempting if and only if Case 2 holds. ¤
Lemma A.3 If f;g 2 H are potentially tempting, then ·f = ·g.
Proof. Given the potentially tempting acts f;g 2 H, let
f0 =
8
<
:
1
U(f)+1f +
U(f)
U(f)+1c¡ if U(f) ¸ 0
1
1¡U(f)f +
¡U(f)
1¡U(f)c+ if U(f) < 0;
g0 =
8
<
:
1
U(g)+1g +
U(g)
U(g)+1c¡ if U(g) ¸ 0
1
1¡U(g)g +
¡U(g)
1¡U(g)c+ if U(g) < 0:
Then f0 2 Hf, g0 2 Hg, and e(f0)e(g0) = c0. By Lemma A.2, Vf(f0) > Vf(c0) = 0 and
Wf(f0) > 0. Fix ° 2 (0;1) such that Vf(f0 ¡ °) > 0 and Wf(f0 ¡ °) > 0. By (15),
U(fc0;f0 ¡ °g = U(ff0 ¡ °g and U(fc0;f0 ¡ 1g) = U(fc0;c¡g) = 0.
De¯ne a function Á on (0;1] by
Á(®) =
U(fc0;f0 ¡ ®g)
U(ff0 ¡ ®g)
=
U(fc0;f0 ¡ ®g)
¡®
:
Then Á is continuous and satis¯es Á(°) = 1 and Á(1) = 0. By continuity, there exists
®f 2 (°;1) such that Á(®f) = 1
2. Then U(f0 ¡ ®f) = ¡®f and Vf(f0 ¡ ®f) =
®f
2 .
Analogously, ¯nd ®g 2 (0;1) such that U(g0 ¡ ®g) = ¡®g and Vg(g0 ¡ ®g) =
®g
2 .
Let f0 = ®g(f0 ¡ ®f) + (1 ¡ ®g)c0 and g0 = ®f(g0 ¡ ®g) + (1 ¡ ®f)c0. Then
Vf(f0) = Vg(g0) =
®f®g
2 > 0 > Wf(f0) = Wg(g0) = ¡
®f®g
2 > U(f0) = U(g0) = ¡®f®g:
Set-Betweenness and the representation (15) imply the rankings
fc0g Â fc0;f0g » fc0;f0;g0g » fc0;g0g Â ff0g » fg0g:
25Take " > 0 such that Vf(c0 + ") < Vf(f0) and Vg(c0 + ") < Vg(g0). By NC,
fc0 + ";c0;f0g » fc0 + ";c0;f0;g0g » fc0 + ";c0;g0g:
By (15), U(fc0 + ";c0;f0g) = "
1¡·f ¡
®f®g
2 , and U(fc0 + ";c0;g0g) = "
1¡·g ¡
®f®g
2 : Thus
"
1¡·f ¡
®f®g
2 = "
1¡·g ¡
®f®g
2 , that is, ·f = ·g. ¤
Let · 2 (0;1) be such that ·h = · for all potentially tempting acts h 2 H (· exists by
Lemma A.3). For every f 2 H, let W(f) = U(f) + V (f), where
² V (f) = Vf(f) if f is potentially tempting,
² V (f) = ·
1¡·U(f) if f is never tempting.
For every menu A 2 A, let
UWV (A) = max
g2A
W(g) ¡ max
g2A
V (g):
Later we show that both W and V are continuous and hence, the maxima in the above
de¯nition are obtained even if A is not ¯nite.
Lemma A.4 If f 2 H is potentially tempting, then
(i) V (f) > ·
1¡·U(f),
(ii) V (¢) = Vf(¢) and W(¢) = Wf(¢) on Hf,
(iii) for all ¯nite menus A 2 Af, U(A) = UWV (A).
Proof. Let f be potentially tempting. (i) By Lemma A.2,
V (f) = Vf(f) > Vf(e(f)) = ·
1¡·U(e(f)) = ·
1¡·U(f):
(ii) Let g = ®f +(1¡®)c 2 Hf. If ® = 0, then g = c 2 C and V (g) = ·
1¡·U(c) = Vf(g). If
® > 0, then g is potentially tempting because there exists c0 2 C such that fc0g Â fc0;fg,
which implies f®c0 + (1 ¡ ®)cg Â f®c0 + (1 ¡ ®)c;gg by Collinear Independence. By
Lemma A.2, the function Vg in representation (15) is unique, and hence, Vg(¢) = Vf(¢) on
Hg ½ Hf. In particular, V (g) = Vg(g) = Vf(g).
(iii) If A 2 Af, then, by Lemma A.2,
U(A) = max
g2A
Wf(g) ¡ max
g2A
Vf(g) = max
g2A
W(g) ¡ max
g2A
V (g) = UWV (A)
because V (g) = Vf(g) and W(g) = Wf(g) for all g 2 A. ¤
Lemma A.5 For all ¯nite menus A 2 A and for all acts f;g 2 H, if U(f) = U(g) and
V (f) = V (g), then U(ffg [ A) = U(fgg [ A):
26Proof. Fix A, f and g as in the hypothesis and consider two possible cases.
Case 1. f is never tempting. By Lemma A.2, for all ® 2 (0;1),
ff + ®g » ff + ®;e(f) ¡ ®g Â fe(f) ¡ ®g;
fe(f) + ®g » fe(f) + ®;f ¡ ®g Â ff ¡ ®g;
and by NC, ff + ®g [ A » ff + ®;e(f) ¡ ®g [ A and fe(f) + ®g [ A » fe(f) + ®;f ¡
®g [ A: Let ® ! 0; by Continuity ffg [ A » ff;e(f)g [ A » fe(f)g [ A: The equality
V (g) = V (f) = ·
1¡·U(f) = ·
1¡·U(g) implies, by Lemma A.4(i), that g is never tempting.
Therefore, a similar argument proves that fgg [ A » fg;e(g)g [ A » fe(g)g [ A: Finally,
ffg [ A » fe(f)g [ A = fe(g)g [ A » fgg [ A, that is, U(ffg [ A) = U(fgg [ A).
Case 2. f is potentially tempting. By (16) and Lemma A.4.(ii),
1 ¸
V (f)¡V (e(f))
V (c+)¡V (e(f)) >
W(f)¡W(e(f))
W(c+)¡W(e(f)) >
U(f)¡U(e(f))
U(c+)¡U(e(f)) = 0:
Let c = e(f) +
W(f)¡W(e(f))
W(c+)¡W(e(f)). Then U(c) > U(f), V (c) < V (f), and W(c) = W(f)
because the functions V and W are linear on Hf. Thus for any su±ciently small ° > 0,
U(c) > U(f + °), V (f + °) > V (f ¡ °) > V (c), and W(f + °) > W(c) > W(f ¡ °). By
Lemma A.4(iii),
fcg Â ff + °;cg » ff + °g » ff + °;f ¡ °g Â ff ¡ °g: (17)
By Lemma A.4(i), g is potentially tempting. Therefore, V and W are linear on Hg as
well; hence, V (g ¡ °) = V (f ¡ °) and W(g ¡ °) = W(f ¡ °). By Lemma A.4(iii) and
Set-Betweenness,
fc;f ¡ °g » fc;f ¡ °;g ¡ °g » fc;g ¡ °g Â fg ¡ °g: (18)
It follows from NC and the rankings (17) and (18) that
ff +°g » ff +°;c;f ¡°g » ff +°;c;f ¡°;g¡°g » ff +°;f ¡°;g¡°g » ff +°;g¡°g:
Thus ff +°g » ff +°;g¡°g Â fg¡°g: Analogously, fg+°g » fg+°;f ¡°g Â ff ¡°g:
By NC, ff +°g[A » ff +°;g ¡°g[A and fg+°g[A » fg+°;f ¡°g[A: Let ° ! 0;
then ffg [ A » ff;gg [ A » fgg [ A by Continuity. ¤
Lemma A.6 For all ¯nite menus A 2 A, U(A) = UWV (A).
Proof. Fix a ¯nite menu A 2 A and consider several possible cases.
Case 1. A = ff;gg, where both f and g are never tempting. Wlog U(f) ¸ U(g). As
U(g) = U(e(g)) and V (g) = ·
1¡·U(g) = V (e(g)), then by Lemmas A.5 and A.2,
U(ff;gg) = U(ff;e(g)g) = maxfU(f);U(e(g))g = U(f):
On the other hand, the equality UWV (ff;gg) = W(f) ¡ V (f)U(f) follows from the de¯-
nitions of the functions V , W, and UWV . Thus, U(A) = UWV (A).
27Case 2. A = ff;gg, where f is potentially tempting, and g is never tempting. Then
U(g) = U(e(g)) and V (g) = V (e(g)). By Lemmas A.5 and A.4 (iv),
U(ff;gg) = U(ff;e(g)g) = UWV (ff;e(g)g) = UWV (ff;gg):
Case 3. A = ff;gg, where both f and g are potentially tempting. Wlog U(f) ¸ U(g).
Consider three possible subcases.
Subcase 3.1. U(f) = U(g). Wlog V (f) ¸ V (g). By Set-Betweenness,
U(ff;gg) = U(ffg) = W(f) ¡ V (f) = UWV (ff;gg):
Subcase 3.2. U(f) > U(g) and V (g) ¸ V (f). We claim that there exist ® 2 (0;1) and
c 2 C such that U(®g+(1¡®)c) = U(f) and V (®g+(1¡®)c) = V (f). To construct such
® and c, let Y (f) = (1 ¡ ·)V (f) ¡ ·U(f) and Y (g) = (1 ¡ ·)V (g) ¡ ·U(g). Then Y (f)
and Y (g) are both positive by Lemma A.4(i) and satisfy the identity
·[U(f)Y (g) ¡ U(g)Y (f)] = (1 ¡ ·)[V (f)Y (g) ¡ V (g)Y (f)]:
The inequalities U(f) > U(g) and V (g) ¸ V (f) imply that Y (g) > Y (f), and hence,
¡1 · U(g) <
U(f)Y (g)¡U(g)Y (f)
Y (g)¡Y (f) = 1¡·
· ¢
V (f)Y (g)¡V (g)Y (f)
Y (g)¡Y (f) · 1¡·
· ¢ V (f) · 1:
Take ® =
Y (f)
Y (g) 2 (0;1) and c 2 C such that U(c) =
U(f)Y (g)¡U(g)Y (f)
Y (g)¡Y (f) 2 [¡1;1]. Then
U(®g + (1 ¡ ®)c) = U(f) by linearity of U, V (c) = ·
1¡·U(c) =
V (f)Y (g)¡V (g)Y (f)
Y (g)¡Y (f) , and
hence, V (®g + (1 ¡ ®)c) = V (f) by linearity of V on Hg.
Conclude by Lemmas A.5 and A.4(iv) that
U(ff;gg) = U(f®g + (1 ¡ ®)c;gg) = UWV (f®g + (1 ¡ ®)c;gg) = UWV (ff;gg):
Subcase 3.3. U(f) > U(g) and V (f) > V (g). As V (g) > V (e(g)) and V is linear on Hf,
there exists ® 2 (0;1) such that V (®f + (1 ¡ ®)e(g)) = V (g). Let f0 = ®f + (1 ¡ ®)e(g).
As 0 < ® < 1, f0 is potentially tempting and satis¯es U(f) > U(f0) > U(g), V (f) >
V (f0) = V (g), and W(f) > W(f0) > W(g). By Lemma A.4(iii) and by Subcase 3.2,
U(ff;f0g) = UWV (ff;f0g) = W(f) ¡ V (f) = U(f) > U(f0) and
U(ff0;gg) = UWV (ff0;gg)W(f0) ¡ V (f0) = U(f0) > U(g):
By NC, ff;gg » ff;f0;gg » ff;f0g » ffg: Thus, U(ff;gg) = U(f) = W(f) ¡ V (f) =
UWV (ff;gg):
Case 4. A is an arbitrary ¯nite menu. Take gA 2 argmaxf2A W(f) and hA 2
argmaxf2A V (f). Then for all f 2 A,
UWV (fgA;fg) ¸ UWV (fgA;hAg) ¸ UWV (ff;hAg):
Cases 1{3 imply that U(fgA;fg) ¸ U(fgA;hAg) ¸ U(ff;hAg); that is, fgA;fg º fgA;hAg º
ff;hAg. From Set-Betweenness, it follows by induction with respect to the size of the set
A that
A =
[
f2A
fgA;fg º fgA;hAg º
[
f2A
ff;hAg = A;
that is, A » fgA;hAg. Thus, U(A) = U(fgA;hAg) = UWV (fgA;hAg) = UWV (A): ¤
28Lemma A.7 There exists a convex and closed set Q of probability measures on S such
that for all f 2 H,
V (f) = ·
1¡· max
q2Q
q ¢ u(f): (19)
Moreover, Q is unique and p 2 Q.
Proof. First show that V is monotonic, continuous, and quasi-convex.
Monotonicity: Take any f;f0 2 H such that f dominates f0. For all ® 2 (0;1), Mono-
tonicity and Lemma A.1 imply that ff +®g » ff +®;f0 ¡®g Â ff0 ¡®g. It follows from
Lemma A.6 that V (f + ®) ¸ V (f0 ¡ ®), that is,
®V (c+) + (1 ¡ ®)V (f) ¸ ®V (c¡) + (1 ¡ ®)V (f0):
Take ® ! 0 to deduce that V (f) ¸ V (f0):
Continuity. Let a sequence of acts fn converge to f as n ! 1. There exist sequences ®n
and ¯n both converging to zero such that f +®n dominates fn, and fn dominates f ¡¯n.
As V is monotonic,
®nV (c+) + (1 ¡ ®n)V (f) ¸ V (fn) ¸ ¯nV (c¡) + (1 ¡ ¯n)V (f):
It follows that V (f) = limn!1 V (fn).
Quasi-Convexity. Suppose that V (®f + (1 ¡ ®)g) > V (f) = V (g) for some f;g 2 H and
® 2 (0;1). Take c 2 C such that
V (®f + (1 ¡ ®)g) > V (c) > V (f) = V (g):
Then V (c) > V (e(f)) and V (c) > V (e(g)). By monotonicity of V , U(c) > U(f), U(c) >
U(g) and hence, U(c) > U(®f + (1 ¡ ®)g). By Lemma A.6, fcg » fc;fg Â ffg and
fcg » fc;gg Â fgg. However,
fcg Â fc;®f + (1 ¡ ®)gg º f®f + (1 ¡ ®)gg;
contradicting Convex Temptation.
The preceding shows that the ranking on H represented by V satis¯es all the axioms
of the maxmax model|these are the axioms of Gilboa and Schmeidler's multiple-priors
model [14], with the exception that \Uncertainty Aversion", which is convexity of weakly
better-than sets, is replaced by convexity of weakly worse-than sets. It follows from [14]
that V has the form (19), and that Q is unique. The inclusion p 2 Q follows from the fact
that for all f 2 H, V (f) ¸ V (e(f)) = p ¢ u(f). ¤
The continuity of V and W implies that UWV is continuous on A. Lemma A.6 asserts
that U ´ UWV on the set of all ¯nite menus, which is dense in A. Thus U ´ UWV on all
of A.
To show the required uniqueness of (u;p;·;Q) in representation (4)-(6), suppose that
this tuple can be replaced by (u0;p0;·0;Q0). Then u0 is a positive linear transformation
of u, and hence, (u;p;·;Q) can be replaced by (u;p0;·0;Q0) as well. The uniqueness
statements in Lemmas A.1, A.2 and A.7 imply that if º is not strategically rational, then
p = p0, · = ·0, and Q = Q0.
29B Appendix: Proofs for Comparative Disso-
nance
Proof of Theorem 4.2: Let º¤ and º conform to our model with corresponding tuples
(u¤;p¤;Q¤;·¤) and (u;p;Q;·). Suppose that neither preference is strategically rational.
Then ·;·¤ > 0 and su±ciency of (9) and (10) is immediate:
ffg Â ff;gg ) [p ¢ u(f) > p ¢ u(g) ^ Q ¢ u(g) > Q ¢ u(f)] )
[p¤ ¢ u¤(f) > p¤ ¢ u¤(g) ^ Q¤ ¢ u¤(g) > Q¤ ¢ u¤(f)] ) ffg Â¤ ff;gg:
For necessity, let º¤ have greater dissonance than º. For all vectors a 2 RS, let
Q ¢ a = max
q2Q
q ¢ a and Q¤ ¢ a = max
q2Q¤ q ¢ a: (20)
Lemma B.1 (i) u and u¤ are cardinally equivalent.
(ii) For all a;b 2 RS,
p ¢ a > p ¢ b and Q ¢ b > Q ¢ a ) p¤ ¢ a > p¤ ¢ b and Q¤ ¢ b > Q¤ ¢ a. (21)
(iii) p = p¤.
Proof. First, show that for all c;c0 2 C,
u(c) = u(c0) ) u¤(c) = u¤(c0): (22)
Suppose to the contrary that u(c) = u(c0) and u¤(c) > u¤(c0) for some c;c0 2 C. Take
f;g 2 H such that ffg Â ff;gg. The equality u(c) = u(c0) implies
f®f + (1 ¡ ®)cg Â f®f + (1 ¡ ®)c;®g + (1 ¡ ®)c0g:
Because º¤ has greater dissonance, ffg Â¤ ff;gg. Therefore, the inequality u¤(c) > u¤(c0)
implies that for su±ciently small ® > 0,
f®f + (1 ¡ ®)cg »¤ f®f + (1 ¡ ®)c;®g + (1 ¡ ®)c0g:
But this contradicts the hypothesis that º¤ has greater dissonance than º.
Take c+;c¡ 2 C such that u(c+) > u(c¡) and u(c+) ¸ u(c) ¸ u(c¡) for all c 2 C.
Then for all c 2 C,
c »
u(c) ¡ u(c¡)
u(c+) ¡ u(c¡)
c+ +
u(c+) ¡ u(c)
u(c+) ¡ u(c¡)
c¡; and by (22),
u¤(c) =
u¤(c+) ¡ u¤(c¡)
u(c+) ¡ u(c¡)
u(c) +
u¤(c¡)u(c+) ¡ u¤(c+)u(c¡)
u(c+) ¡ u(c¡)
:
Note that u¤(c+) 6= u¤(c¡) because º¤ is not strategically rational and hence non-
degenerate. Thus, either u¤ is a positive linear transformation of u, or u¤ is a negative
30linear transformation of u. Next, we show that the former case implies statements (ii) and
(iii), and that the latter case is impossible.
Case 1. u¤ is a positive linear transformation of u. Wlog assume that u = u¤ and
u(C) = u¤(C) = [¡1;1]. Fix any a;b 2 RS such that p ¢ a > p ¢ b and Q ¢ b > Q ¢ a. Take
® > 0 such that j ®a(s) j; j ®b(s) j · 1 for all s 2 S. Then ®a = u(f) and ®b = u(g) for
some f;g 2 H. (Here u(f) and u(g) are vectors in RS.) Then
p ¢ a > p ¢ b and Q ¢ b > Q ¢ a ) p ¢ u(f) > p ¢ u(g) and Q ¢ u(g) > Q ¢ u(f) )
ffg Â ff;gg ) ffg Â¤ ff;gg )
p¤ ¢ u(f) > p¤ ¢ u(g) and Q¤ ¢ u(g) > Q¤ ¢ u(f) ) p¤ ¢ a > p¤ ¢ b and Q¤ ¢ b > Q¤ ¢ a;
which proves (ii).
To show (iii), suppose that p 6= p¤. Let
R = fq 2 RS : q = p + ®(p ¡ p¤) for ® ¸ 0g = fq 2 RS : p 2 [q;p¤]g:
Consider two subcases.
(1) Q 6½ R: Let p0 2 QnR. Take a hyperplane b 2 RS that separates the singleton p
and the segment [p0;p¤]:
p ¢ b < 0; p0 ¢ b > 0; p¤ ¢ b > 0:
These inequalities violate (21) for a = 0.
(2) Q ½ R: Then Q is a segment with end points p and p0 = p + ®(p ¡ p¤) for some
® > 0. Note that p is an interior point of the segment [p¤;p0]. Take a hyperplane
a 2 RS that separates p¤ and p0 and passes through p:
p¤ ¢ a > 0; p ¢ a = 0; p0 ¢ a < 0:
Take a hyperplane b 2 RS that separates p0 and the segment [p;p¤]:
p0 ¢ b > 0; p ¢ b < 0; p¤ ¢ b < 0:
Wlog p¤ ¢ a > Q¤ ¢ b (multiply a by a positive scalar if needed). Thus p ¢ a > p ¢ b,
Q ¢ b ¸ p0 ¢ b > 0 = maxfp ¢ a;p0 ¢ ag = Q ¢ a;
but Q¤ ¢ a ¸ p¤ ¢ a > Q¤ ¢ b. This contradicts (21).
Case 2. u¤ is a negative linear transformation of u. We show this is impossible.
Wlog assume that u¤ = ¡u and u(C) = u¤(C) = [¡1;1]. Then, paralleling (21) in the
previous case,
p ¢ a > p ¢ b and Q ¢ b > Q ¢ a ) p¤ ¢ (¡a) > p¤ ¢ (¡b) and Q¤ ¢ (¡b) > Q¤ ¢ (¡a): (23)
for all a;b 2 RS. It follows that for some a;b 2 RS, p ¢ a > p ¢ b but p¤ ¢ a < p¤ ¢ b. Thus
p 6= p¤. Consider two subcases.
31(1) Q 6½ [p;p¤]: Let p0 2 Qn[p;p¤]. Take a hyperplane b 2 RS that separates p0 and
[p;p¤]:
p0 ¢ b > 0; p ¢ b < 0; p¤ ¢ b < 0:
This contradicts (23) for a = 0.
(2) Q ½ [p;p¤]: Then Q is a segment with end points p and p0 = ®p¤ + (1 ¡ ®)p for
some ® > 0. Take a hyperplane a 2 RS that separates p and [p0;p¤]:
p ¢ a = 0; p0 ¢ a < 0; p¤ ¢ a < 0:
Take another hyperplane b 2 RS that separates p and [p0;p¤]:
p ¢ b < 0; p0 ¢ b > 0; p¤ ¢ b > 0:
Wlog p¤ ¢ (¡a) > Q¤ ¢ (¡b) (multiply a by a positive scalar if needed). Then
p ¢ a = 0 > p ¢ b,
Q ¢ b ¸ p0 ¢ b > 0 = maxfp0 ¢ a;p ¢ ag = Q ¢ a;
but Q¤ ¢ (¡a) ¸ p¤ ¢ (¡a) > Q¤ ¢ (¡b). This contradicts (23). ¤
The following method of proof is analogous to the one used by Kopylov [20]. Let D
be the set of all points a 2 RS at which the convex functions Q ¢ a and Q¤ ¢ a are both
di®erentiable. By [30, Theorem 25.5], the complement of the set D has measure zero. Thus
D is dense. For every a 2 D, let
q(a) = r(Q ¢ a) and q¤(a) = r(Q¤ ¢ a)
be the derivatives of Q ¢ a and Q¤ ¢ a respectively. Let ~ 1 = (1;:::;1) 2 RS.
Lemma B.2 The functions q(¢);q¤(¢) : D ! RS have the following properties:
(i) For all a 2 D and q 2 Q, q = q(a) i® Q ¢ a = q ¢ a.
(ii) For all a 2 D and q 2 Q¤, q = q¤(a) i® Q¤ ¢ a = q ¢ a.
(iii) If a 2 D, ® > 0 and ° 2 R, then
®a + °~ 1 2 D; q(®a + °~ 1) = q(a); q¤(®a + °~ 1) = q¤(a).
(iv) For any a 2 D, there exists ²a 2 [0;1] such that q(a) = ²aq¤(a) + (1 ¡ ²a)p.
(v) There exists ² 2 [0;1] such that q(a) = ²q¤(a) + (1 ¡ ²)p for all a 2 D.
Proof.
(i) Fix a 2 D and q 2 Q such that Q ¢ a = q ¢ a. For all b 2 RS and ± 2 R,
Q ¢ a + ±(q ¢ b) = q ¢ (a + ±b) · Q ¢ (a + ±b) = Q ¢ a + ±(q(a) ¢ b) + o(±):
Then q ¢ b = q(a) ¢ b for all b 2 RS, that is, q = q(a). Similarly for (ii).
32(iii) Fix a 2 D, ® > 0 and ° 2 R. Then ®a + °~ 1 2 D because the superposition
Q ¢ b = ®Q ¢
³
b¡°~ 1
®
´
+ ° is di®erentiable at ®a + °~ 1. By (i), q(®a + °~ 1) = q(a)
because Q¢(®a+°~ 1) = ®(Q¢a)+° = q(a)¢(®a+°~ 1). Similarly for Q¤ and q¤ (¢).
(iv) Suppose that for some a no such ²a exists. Let b separate q (a) from the segment
[q¤ (a);p], so that q¤(a)¢b < 0, p¢b < 0, but q(a)¢b > 0. Then for su±ciently small
± > 0, Q¤ ¢ (a + ±b) = Q¤ ¢ a + ±(q¤(a) ¢ b) + o(±) < Q¤ ¢ a, but also
p ¢ a > p ¢ (a + ±b) and Q ¢ (a + ±b) ¸ q (a) ¢ (a + ±b) > q (a) ¢ a = Q ¢ a:
By (21), Q¤ ¢ (a + ±b) > Q¤ ¢ a, a contradiction.
(v) Let a;b 2 D be such that q¤(a) 6= p and q¤(b) 6= p, and prove ²a = ²b. (Note that
if q¤(a) 6= p, then ²a is unique, and if q¤(a) = p, then ²a 2 [0;1] is arbitrary. ) As
q¤(a) 6= p and p = p¤ 2 Q¤, then by (iii), Q¤ ¢a > p¢a. Similarly, Q¤ ¢b > p¢b. Let
a0 =
a ¡ (p ¢ a)~ 1
Q¤ ¢ a ¡ p ¢ a
and b0 =
b ¡ (p ¢ b)~ 1
Q¤ ¢ b ¡ p ¢ b
:
By (iii) and (iv), a0;b0 2 D, q¤(a0) = q¤(a), q¤(b0) = q¤(b), and
q(a0) = q(a) = ²aq¤(a) + (1 ¡ ²a)p and q(b0) = q(b) = ²bq¤(b) + (1 ¡ ²b)p:
By construction, p ¢ a0 = p ¢ b0 = 0, Q¤ ¢ a0 = Q¤ ¢ b0 = 1, Q ¢ a0 = ²a, and Q ¢ b0 = ²b.
Suppose that ²a 6= ²b; wlog let ²a < ²b. Then for su±ciently small ° > 0,
p ¢ (a0 + °~ 1) = ° > p ¢ b0; Q ¢ (a0 + °~ 1) = ²a + ° < ²b = Q ¢ b0;
but Q¤ ¢ (a0 + °~ 1) = 1 + ° > Q¤ ¢ b0. This contradicts (21). Thus ²a = ²b. ¤
Conclude that Q ¢ a = ²(Q¤ ¢ a) + (1 ¡ ²)(p ¢ a) for all a 2 D and hence, by continuity,
for all a 2 RS. It follows that Q = ²Q¤ + (1 ¡ ²)p; ² > 0 because º is not strategically
rational. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Proof of Theorem 4.3: Let º¤ and º conform to our model with corresponding tuples
(u¤;p¤;Q¤;·¤) and (u;p;Q;·). Suppose that neither preference is strategically rational.
Let P = (1 ¡ ·)fpg + ·Q and P¤ = (1 ¡ ·¤)fp¤g + ·¤Q¤. The conditions (9), (10),
and ·¤ ¸ ²· imply
P =
³
1 ¡
²·
·¤
´
fpg +
²·
·¤P¤:
Su±ciency of these conditions now follows from:
ffg Â ff;gg » fgg ) [p ¢ u(f) > p ¢ u(g) ^ P ¢ u(g) > P ¢ u(f)] )
[p¤ ¢ u¤(f) > p¤ ¢ u¤(g) ^ P¤ ¢ u¤(g) > P¤ ¢ u¤(f)] ) ffg Â¤ ff;gg »¤ fgg:
For necessity, let º¤ be more self-justifying than º. Then º¤ has more dissonance
than º, and Theorem 4.3 implies (9) and (10). Moreover, for all a;b 2 RS,
p ¢ a > p ¢ b and P ¢ b > P ¢ a ) p¤ ¢ a > p¤ ¢ b and P¤ ¢ b > P ¤ ¢ a. (24)
33To prove this claim, ¯x any a;b 2 RS. Take ® > 0 and f;g 2 H such that ®a = u(f) and
®b = u(g). Then
p ¢ a > p ¢ b and P ¢ b > P ¢ a ) p ¢ u(f) > p ¢ u(g) and P ¢ u(g) > P ¢ u(f) )
ffg Â ff;gg » fgg ) ffg Â¤ ff;gg »¤ fgg )
p¤ ¢ u(f) > p¤ ¢ u(g) and P¤ ¢ u(g) > P ¤ ¢ u(f) ) p¤ ¢ a > p¤ ¢ b and P¤ ¢ b > P ¤ ¢ a.
Use the condition (24) to replace Q and Q¤ by P and P¤ in Lemma B.2 and obtain
0 < µ · 1 such that P = (1 ¡ µ)fpg + µP¤. In particular, P ½ P¤ and therefore also
(1 ¡ ·²)fpg + ·²Q¤ ½ (1 ¡ ·¤)fpg + ·¤Q¤:
As Q¤ is a nonsingleton, ·² · ·¤. ¤
C Appendix: Examples
We provide some details for Example 1.
Set-Betweenness: suppose that U (A) · U (B). Then
U (A [ B) =
maxh2A[B [U (h)V (h)]
maxh02A[B V (h0)
=
maxfmaxh2A [U (h)V (h)]; maxh2B [U (h)V (h)]g
maxfmaxh2A V (h); maxh2B V (h)g
·
max
n
maxh2A V (h)
maxh2B V (h) maxh2B [U (h)V (h)]; maxh2B [U (h)V (h)]
o
maxfmaxh2A V (h); maxh2B V (h)g
.
If
maxh2A V (h)
maxh2B V (h) · 1, then above equals
maxh2B[U(h)V (h)]
maxh2B V (h) = U (B). If
maxh2A V (h)
maxh2B V (h) ¸ 1, then
above equals
maxh2A V (h)
maxh2B V (h) maxh2B [U (h)V (h)]
maxh2A V (h)
= U (B):
Thus U (A [ B) · U (B):
The veri¯cation of U (A) · U (A [ B) is symmetric:
U (A [ B) =
maxfmaxh2A [U (h)V (h)]; maxh2B [U (h)V (h)]g
maxfmaxh2A V (h); maxh2B V (h)g
¸
max
n
maxh2A [U (h)V (h)];
maxh2B V (h)
maxh2A V (h) maxh2A [U (h)V (h)]
o
maxfmaxh2A V (h); maxh2B V (h)g
If
maxh2B V (h)
maxh2A V (h) · 1, then above equals
maxh2A[U(h)V (h)]
maxh2A V (h) = U (A). If
maxh2B V (h)
maxh2A V (h) ¸ 1, then
above equals
maxh2B V (h)
maxh2A V (h) maxh2A [U (h)V (h)]
maxh2B V (h)
= U (A):
34Thus U (A [ B) ¸ U (A):
NC: ff0g Â ff;f0g » ffg =) [U (f0) > U (f) ^ UV (f0) < UV (f)].
But choice out of ff;f0;gg solves maxh=f;f0;gU (h)V (h) - it follows that f0 could not be
chosen. Thus ff;f0g » ff;f0;gg as argued in the text.
Similarly if ffg » ff;f0g Â ff0g. The bottom line is that NC is satis¯ed because the
temptation ranking is represented by V and choice out of menus is rationalizable by UV .
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